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Introduction 
In recent years, the concept of world constitutionalism has become remarkably 
popular among international legal scholars. While fifteen years ago, endorsing it 
was considered a somewhat extravagant position – associated with delusional, 
rather than progressive thinking – there is currently much fervent support for the 
concept. To refer to “constitutional structures” in international law or even to the 
“international constitution” or the “constitution of international law” has become 
commonplace in legal doctrine. In most instances these terms are used without 
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quotation or question marks. Especially to European lawyers, world constitution-
alism seems to suggest a kind of “realistic international utopia” for our time.  
Interestingly, criticism is somewhat mute. This seems partly due to the absence 
in international legal theory of alternative concepts offering a similarly attractive 
framework of analysis. Furthermore, opposition to the concept is likely to be ac-
cused of static, old-fashioned thinking – of a backward view rooted in the over-
come intellectual framework of the Westphalian world, which ignores the chal-
lenges of our time. Use of constitutional language, on the other hand, seems to 
provide the feeling of being on the safe side in the debate.  
In our view, the debate suffers from two “blind spots”. On the one hand, au-
thors using the concept of world constitutionalism often tend to neglect counter-
arguments concerning disintegrating trends in international relations and interna-
tional law.1 On the other hand, hardly any attention is devoted to the question 
how the debate is linked – or should be linked – with the common understanding 
of the term “constitution”. Related, but often ignored questions are: How far 
should doctrinal language take account of the common understanding of its key 
terms? What about the irritations of those not familiar with our doctrinal discourse 
when they hear that there exists something like “international constitutional law” 
or a “global constitution”? 
The purpose of the article is to provide a meta-level account on the problem of 
world constitutionalism. It shall offer a critical reexamination of the debate and 
proceeds as follows: The empirical adequacy of the concept is addressed in a diag-
nostic Part I in which an overview of the arguments relied on by the proponents of 
world constitutionalism is provided. These arguments are contrasted with a survey 
of counter-perspectives on international legal developments. The first part con-
cludes with the thesis that the concept’s success can hardly be explained by its ex-
planatory value. In Part II, an analysis of doctrinal strategies to identify constitu-
tional phenomena and processes in the international sphere is provided. Three 
main strategies can be discerned: a “semantic strategy”, a “correspondence strat-
egy”, and an “ethical-pragmatic strategy”. Part III proposes a different “reading” 
of the concept of “world constitutionalism”. It suggests a social constructivist view 
on the topic. In our view, the debate on world constitutionalism should be re-
garded as an attempt to contribute to r e - s h a p i n g  the international reality by 
c h a n g i n g  o u r  k n o w l e d g e  of the international world. Opening up the debate 
for such considerations, the article shows the value of the concept as a “realistic 
utopia” for our time.  
                                                        
1
  An exception being A. P e t e r s ’  article Reconstruction constitutionnaliste du droit international: 
arguments pour et contre, in: Emanuelle Jouannet/Hélène Ruiz Fabri/Vincent Tomkiewics (eds.), Se-
lect Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, Vol. I, Oxford 2008, 361-375. 
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I. The Ambiguous Factual Basis of the World 
 Constitutionalism-Argument  
1. Indications of Constitutional Processes 
At present, the world constitutionalism-argument identifies three trends in the 
international legal order that serve as indicators of constitutional processes: 
a) The first trend lies in the increased “moralization” or “humanization” of in-
ternational law.2 Developments in the field of humanitarian intervention mostly 
serve as the primary support for this argument. From the constitutionalist perspec-
tive, interventions enforce the fundamental values of the international community 
against unacceptable behavior of one of its members. As Armin v o n  B o g d a n d y  
pointed out, the constitutionalist approach “culminates” in the “right to interven-
tion”.3 The bombing of Serbia by NATO forces and the subsequent intervention 
in Kosovo, for example, were regarded by many as important steps from a world 
of sovereign states towards a constitutionalized international order based on rec-
ognition of human rights (H a b e r m a s ).4 
The moralization-thesis is also supported by developments in the field of human 
rights in general. Some catchwords may suffice here. The establishment of the In-
ternational Criminal Court – despite all its flaws – signaled a hitherto unprece-
dented intention to sanction the most flagrant violations of human rights. Human 
rights treaties are increasingly recognized as having a different character from “or-
dinary” treaty law; they are attributed, for example, a special role in cases of state 
succession.5 There has also been increasing political pressure since the 1990s on 
states to ratify important human rights treaties. Former communist states in 
Europe, for example, were expected to become a member of the Council of Europe 
as the most important regional human rights organization. This regional organiza-
tion now embraces all European countries except Belarus.6 Another example of 
                                                        
2
  See Th. M e r o n , The Humanization of International Law, 2006. Moralization of international 
law in the 20th century began after World War I with the partial ban on the use of force and rudimen-
tary attempts to protect human rights. 
3
  A. v. B o g d a n d y , Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization, and 
International Law, 15 EJIL (2004), 895 n. 44. 
4
  This debate is related to the problem of an international d u t y  to protect, see A. B a n n o n , The 
responsibility to protect: The U.N. World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism, 115 Yale L.J. 
(2006), 1157, 1165. 
5
  In cases of state succession, the successor state is, according to the “clean slate” doctrine, nor-
mally not bound by treaties concluded by its predecessor state, see I. B r o w n l i e , Principles of Public 
International Law, 2003, 633-634. In the case of human rights treaties, the view is gaining support that 
these treaties are transmissible and become binding even upon the successor state, see J.A. F r o w e i n , 
Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts, 39 BDGVR (2000), 427, 438. 
6
  It merits comment that, in political discourse on state crimes, the genocide perpetrated on the 
Jewish people in the Second World War, as a sort of negative point of reference, became the basis for a 
commonly accepted value system. Beginning in the 1980s, there developed a “culture of apology” 
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“moralization” can be seen in the tendency to take into account the democratic le-
gitimacy of a government in the practice of state recognition.7 
b) The second trend can be described as the (further) “differentiation” of inter-
national law. A distinction can be made between horizontal and vertical aspects of 
this process. Horizontal differentiation refers to the complex phenomenon of ex-
pansion of international law (i.e. increase of binding rules upon the subjects of in-
ternational law, multiplication of actors).8 Part of the “globalization” phenomenon 
is that competencies are increasingly shared with or even shifted to the interna-
tional plane.9 The international legal order constantly expands to new fields and 
questions hitherto reserved to the domestic legal order. In the field of international 
economic law, for example, the so called “Doha Round” tries to expand the scope 
of rules on trade in services and on the protection of intellectual property rights to 
new questions. International economic law is expected to become more dense and 
precise in these fields in the relatively near future. This is also true for many other 
of the following areas of international law: international environmental law, which 
has to deal with problems such as the greenhouse effect; international communica-
tion law, which is facing issues concerning the use and abuse of the internet; inter-
national migration law, which has to deal with increasing pressure on industrial-
ized states. The list obviously could be extended easily. Horizontal differentiation 
can be interpreted as a sign of constitutionalization of the international legal order 
because the subject matter of the adopted competencies often is “constitutional” in 
nature (regulation of fundamental community interests).  
The vertical aspect of “differentiation” concerns the issue of hierarchy in inter-
national law.10 Much has been written on this issue – we shall only consider some 
catchwords. Hierarchy-generating elements in the international legal order are 
considered to be established, inter alia, by the concept of ius cogens,11 by the 
somewhat blurry notion of rules with erga omnes effect,12 by the recognition of in-
ternational crimes13 and by virtue of norms explicitly creating a priority of some 
                                                        
which reprogrammed political language from a language of interest politics to a language of morals. 
See T. M a i s s e n , Zweifeln, Gedenken, Vertrauen. Nationale Selbstprüfungen beim Übergang ins 21. 
Jahrhundert, in: C. Abbt/O. Diggelmann (eds.), Zweifelsfälle, Bern 2007, 125-127. 
 
7
  See F r o w e i n  (note 5), 430. 
 
8
  See P.-M. D u p u y , The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal Sys-
tem and the International Court of Justice, 31 JILP (1999), 791, 795. 
 
9
  For an overview on the manifold meanings of globalization, see v. B o g d a n d y  (note 3), 885-
906. 
10
  See the groundbreaking work by P. W e i l , Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 
77 AJIL (1983), 413-442. 
11
  Articles 53, 64 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969); from the abundant literature 
on ius cogens, see J.A. F r o w e i n , Jus Cogens, EPIL, vol. 3, 1997, 65-69 with further references. 
12
  See M. R a g a z z i , The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, 1997. 
13
  See Art. 5-8, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998); see, generally, 
B r o w n l i e  (note 5), 559-575. 
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legal regimes over others, e.g. Art. 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.14 The 
existence of a hierarchy in international law is central to the world constitutional-
ism-argument since the possibility of priority of one legal regime over another or 
the invalidation of norms by higher-ranking law are “classical” features of consti-
tutional law.15 
c) The third trend – which is closely connected to the second – is the significance 
of “partial” or “parallel constitutions” emerging next to domestic constitutions. 
These partial or parallel constitutions come into existence when, given the ever 
more complex and dense regulatory achievements on the international plane, indi-
vidual states are only partly “in control” of the international legal structures they 
have created – when they are either by soft power or by legally obligating rules 
bound to give effect to decisions taken by international bodies. Once such struc-
tures are established, they follow the rules agreed upon. An example for a parallel 
constitution in the field of international security can be seen in the mandate of the 
Security Council and its extensive interpretation whereby the Security Council as-
sumes the role of a quasi-executive organ within the Charter context.16 It is a char-
acteristic of partial or parallel constitutional law that its interpretation by the com-
petent bodies follows a “dynamic” or “evolutive” approach.17 A well-known ex-
ample is the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) by the Strasbourg Court.18  
Parallel constitutions exert a constitutionalizing impact on the domestic consti-
tutional order. The process of world constitutionalism is here viewed from its ef-
fect of limiting or substantially influencing the exercise of state power (“Interna-
tionalisierung des Verfassungsrechts”).19 The domestic constitutional order is under 
increasing pressure to adapt to international legal developments. This development 
is particularly visible in constitutional adjudication and its reception of interna-
tional or transnational human rights developments. For example, even states with a 
long-standing history of indifference towards international law in constitutional 
                                                        
14
  For a critical assessment of this argument, see A. P a u l u s , Die internationale Gemeinschaft im 
Völkerrecht, 2001, 308-309. 
15
  Sometimes this view is supported by the argument that the evolution of a hierarchy indicates a 
shift of paradigm in international law from a horizontal, civil-law-like system to a more vertical, pub-
lic-law-like system with strengthened centralized authorities, hierarchical elements, and bindingness of 
some norms against the actor’s will, see A. P e t e r s , Global Constitutionalism in a Nutshell, in: K. 
Dicke et al. (eds.), Weltinnenrecht, Liber amicorum Jost Delbrück, 2005, 535, 545. 
16
  See P.M. D u p u y , The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revis-
ited, 1 Max Planck UNYB (1997), 1, 21-24. 
17
  R. B e r n h a r d t , Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 42 GYIL (2000), 11-25. 
18
  H.-J. C r e m e r , Regeln der Konventionsinterpretation, in: R. Grote/Th. Marauhn (eds.), 
EMRK/GG, Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz, 2006, 
155, 174-229 (with references to the jurisprudence of the ECHR). 
19
  See, generally, B.-O. B r y d e , Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und Internationalisierung 
des Verfassungsrechts, 42 Der Staat (2003), 61, 62 et seq. 
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adjudication such as the United States are beginning to show some willingness to 
consider advancements in international or transnational law.20 In Europe, the 
ECHR is by some considered as a “partial constitution”.21 Sometimes, the GATT/ 
WTO-law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are referred to as other 
examples of parallel or partial constitutions in international law.22 In a nutshell, the 
argument is that a process of world constitutionalism is visible in the permeation 
and limitation of the domestic legal order by parallel or partial constitutions of in-
ternational law.  
2. Disintegrating Trends 
However, things are more complex than outlined in the previous section. In fact, 
all trends suggesting world constitutionalization can be countered by develop-
ments pointing in a different direction.  
a) The moralization trend in international law can easily be challenged by point-
ing to state practice contrary to fundamental international values. Even though, ac-
cording to David H u m e ’ s  famous rule, “Is” and “Ought to be”-statements need 
to be distinguished,23 one cannot deny the diminishing impact of unlawful state 
conduct upon an existing or perceived international value order. Two examples 
may suffice: the continuing disarray in the inter-Atlantic perception regarding the 
ban on the use of force and the current revival of a spell-breaking, realist perspec-
tive on the international human rights discourse.  
Recent developments in international relations have caused some commentators 
to question even cornerstones of international values such as the ban on the use of 
force as set out in Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter.24 In this respect, the humanitarian 
intervention by NATO forces in Kosovo (1999) – the deployment of which was, in 
our view, at the time morally justifiable, but legally highly doubtful – only set the 
tune for what was to come.25 Two other developments followed suit: the US gov-
ernment’s claimed right to preventive self-defense as expressed in the National Se-
                                                        
20
  H. K o h , International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AJIL (2004), 43-57; for a more skeptical 
view, see A. B i a n c h i , International Law and U.S. Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 15 
EJIL (2004), 751-781. 
21
  Ch. W a l t e r , Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention als Konstitutionalisierungsprozeß, 
59 ZaöRV (1999), 961, 964. 
22
  See Ch. W a l t e r , Constitutionalizing (Inter-)national Governance: Possibilities for and Limits 
to the Development of an International Constitutional Law, 44 GYIL (2001), 170-201. 
23
  D. H u m e , Treatise of Human Nature, L. Selby-Bigge (ed.), 1978, bk III, part 1, ch. 1. 
24
  M.J. G l e n n o n , Why the Security Council Failed, 82 Foreign Affairs (2003), 16. 
25
  Among the many authors denying the legality of “Operation Allied Force”, see Antonio 
C a s s e s e , Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EJIL (1999), 23, 25; H. N e u h o l d , 
Collective Security After “Operation Allied Force”, 4 Max Planck UNYB. (2000), 73, 102 (with fur-
ther references). 
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curity Strategy of 2002 and its application in the “Operation Iraqi Freedom” 
(2003).26 If the ban on the use of force may legitimately be regarded as a constitu-
tional cornerstone of modern international relations, the latter developments may 
only be interpreted as destructive to the international value order.  
Regarding human rights, reference to these rights often is obviously rhetorical 
and devoid of real commitment. For example, it has been noted that the United 
States, as the only remaining super-power, though assiduously reprimanding hu-
man rights violations by other states, has a poor human rights record itself in many 
respects (e.g. reluctance to ratify basic human rights treaties, and, of course, Guan-
tanamo Bay).27 Furthermore, some influential, mostly U.S-American writers have 
articulated serious doubts whether states’ acting on human rights principles really 
derives from their acceptance as legally binding norms.28 According to their view, 
what really moves international relations is not respect for law, but mere prudence 
or instrumental reason.29 Lastly, the selectivity in the practice of humanitarian in-
tervention is detrimental to the moralization trend. The ongoing humanitarian cri-
sis in Chechnya, for example, did not cause any attempt by the international com-
munity to intervene. 
b) Taking horizontal differentiation, i.e. the expansion of the international legal 
order, as indicative of constitutional processes in international law also raises seri-
ous queries. Constitutionalism does not only entail a quantitative increase of legal 
norms but essentially makes a claim about the process itself that the process is 
aimed in a certain direction or goal. The finality of the constitutionalization pro-
cesses can be stated in terms of system-creation; constitutionalism and system-
building are related concepts. Again, as with moralization, it is important to disen-
tangle the empirical question of whether there is something like an international 
legal system in the making and the normative issue of whether such a development 
is desirable. Thus, the initial question of this paragraph can be refocused by asking 
if there is factual evidence for an evolving international legal system. Surprisingly, 
recent scholarship for the most part deals only in passing with the notion of an in-
ternational legal system; in the field of international law, the implications of the 
system-notion are still somewhat underdeveloped.30 Some commentators affirm 
the factual existence of an international legal system by reference to its substantive 
                                                        
26
  For a detailed analysis, see H. N e u h o l d , Law and Force in International Relations – European 
and American Positions, 64 ZaöRV (2004), 263, 273-279. 
27
  Ibid., 264-265. 
28
  J.L. G o l d s m i t h /E.A. P o s n e r , The Limits of International Law, 2005, 111. For detailed 
criticism of this position, see H.-J. C r e m e r , Völkerrecht – Alles nur Rhetorik?, 67 ZaöRV (2007), 
267-296. 
29
  See G o l d s m i t h / P o s n e r  (note 28), 11-12. 
30
  The exception being, of course, the application of Niklas L u h m a n n ’ s  theory of autopoietic 
systems to international relations, see G. T e u b n e r  (ed.), Global Law Without a State, 1997. 
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content, i.e. the horizontal differentiation of the international legal order.31 The no-
tion of a legal system implies order, unity, and coherence.32  
This, however, is squarely at odds with the well-known fragmentation of inter-
national law. If constitutionalism entails a gravitational center around which hori-
zontal differentiation takes place, international relations are hardly a good candi-
date for application of the notion. Horizontal differentiation did not only occur 
within the framework of the United Nations, but essentially meant a rapid prolif-
eration of specialized, a u t o n o m o u s  regimes partly endowed with strong institu-
tional frameworks and their own judicial bodies.33 There is strong evidence that in-
ternational law never was and will likely never become a legal system in the tradi-
tional meaning of the term.34 
The impact of fragmentation is well-documented for the fields of human rights 
law, law of the sea, and world trade law.35 The increase in separate legal regimes en-
trusted with a limited mandate is likely to produce incoherent or even conflicting 
decisions among the various actors. The so-called “Swordfish case” provides a fa-
mous example: The EU requested a WTO panel to investigate a dispute concerning 
the alleged violation by Chile’s prohibition on unloading swordfish in Chilean 
ports.36 In this case, the EU claimed a violation of GATT 1994, while Chile 
claimed that the Convention on the Law of the Sea had been violated and brought 
the case before the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.37 In 2002, the par-
ties reached a provisional agreement and the claims were suspended; however, each 
party reserved the right to resume the proceedings at any time.38 
c) The third trend, which essentially uses the limitation and permeation of the 
domestic constitutional order by international law as an argument for constitu-
tionalization, is called into question by recent acts of unilateralism. Constitution-
alization traditionally refers to the limitation of individual powers for the benefit 
                                                        
31
  For example, D u p u y  (note 8), 796; for a skeptical view, see B. K i n g s b u r y , Foreword: Is the 
Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals A Systemic Problem?, 31 JILP (1999), 679, 690. 
32
  C.-W. C a n a r i s , Systemdenken und Systembegriff, 1983, 40 ff., 155. 
33
  See P a u l u s  (note 14), 314-315. 
34
  A. F i s c h e r - L e s c a n o /G. T e u b n e r , The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation 
of Global Law, Mich. JIL 25 (2004), 999-1046. 
35
  G. H a f n e r , Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, Mich. JIL, 25 
(2004), 849-863; G. A b i - S a a b , Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31 JILP 
(1999), 919-932. For a different view, see M. K o s k e n n i e m i , Fragmentation of International Law, 
2007. 
36
  7 November 2000, WTO, WT/DS193/2, Chile – Measures Affecting the Transit and Importa-
tion of Swordfish, Request for the Establishment of Panel by the European Communities; for a de-
tailed analysis of this case see P.-T. S t o l l /S. V ö n e k y , The Swordfish Case: Law of the Sea v. Trade, 
62 ZaöRV (2002), 21-35; for contextualization of this case with regard to the problem of proliferation 
of international judicial bodies, see K. O e l l e r s - F r a h m , Multiplication of International Courts and 
Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction – Problems and Possible Solutions, 5 Max Planck UNYB 
(2001), 67, 86-8. 
37
  S t o l l / V ö n e k y  (note 36), 22. 
38
  Ibid., 23. 
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of collective power. If world constitutionalization thus hinges upon the idea of 
limitation of state power by legalization (e.g. through parallel or partial interna-
tional constitutions), then unilateral acts are suspect in the light of world constitu-
tionalism in that they claim a residuum of state-of-nature-powers.39 Acts of unilat-
eralism can be manifold and more or less subtle.40 
Though not a new phenomenon, the problem of unilateral acts seems more 
acute now than before. This is due to a certain revival in recent years and a deep-
ened internationalism which must reject any unilateralist approach.41 The list of re-
cent acts of American unilateralism, for example, is long: the U.S. refusal to join 
the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, the resistance to submit to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC), the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty with Russia, and, finally, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” (2003).42 In recent 
years, Russia, to give a second example, re-discovered its ambitions to become a 
regional hegemonial power at its southern borders. It openly put pressure on its 
neighboring states to comply with its interests, even if this violated their sover-
eignty rights.43 
3. More Than an Analytical Tool 
Given the ambiguous state of world affairs, the world-constitutionalism-
argument cannot derive its force entirely from its explanatory value. The factual 
basis is too contradictory. In our view, the concept cannot be understood ap-
propriately if it is regarded as a purely “analytical” or “descriptive” tool. It has a 
“sub-text” which deserves our attention.  
                                                        
39
  Of course, international law recognizes residual instances of legitimate unilateral action, see P.-
M. D u p u y , The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law, 11 EJIL 
(2000), 19, 23-25. 
40
  See N. K r i s c h , International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of 
the International Order, 16 EJIL (2005), 369-408, who distinguishes four strategies in dominant states’ 
interaction with international law: instrumentalization, withdrawal, reshaping and replacing interna-
tional law. These strategies, though not corresponding to unilateral acts in a strict sense, represent a 
useful “political” view on unilateralism. 
41
  For American unilateralism, see J. R u b e n f e l d , Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 New 
York Univ. LR (2004), 1971, 1981-1982.  
42
  See ibid., 1977. 
43
  See also H. A d o m e i t , Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne, 61 Internationale Politik (2006), 6-13; E. 
A l b r e c h t , Mit Gasprom zurück auf die Weltbühne, 37 Das Parlament (2007). 
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II. Strategies to Legitimize Constitutional Language in 
 International Relations 
How is the use of constitutional language justified in international law doctrine? 
How do the proponents of world constitutionalism legitimize the use of constitu-
tionalist vocabulary?  
1. Three Strategies 
Currently, there are three major strategies to introduce constitutional language 
in the international context: 
a) The first strategy can be called “semantic strategy”. Legal scholarship em-
ploying this strategy departs from the premise that constitutional language has to 
be adjusted to make it applicable to the particularities of the international order. It 
is thus “semantic” in the sense that it re-defines basic concepts of constitutional 
language or the conditions of their application. For example, if it is claimed that 
“the fundamental order of any autonomous community [...] can be addressed as a 
constitution”,44 the notion “constitution” is stripped of its conditioned meaning 
and re-defined to reflect the characteristics of the international legal order. The 
force of the argument then depends on the possibility to demonstrate that there is 
in fact an “international community”. The process of re-definition of basic con-
cepts of constitutionalism, most importantly of the term “constitution” itself, but 
also of “government” or “rule of law”, is the necessary first step undertaken by 
those employing the “semantic strategy”.  
b) The second strategy proceeds by searching for “constitutional functions”, 
“constitutional elements” or “constitutionalist substance” in the international 
sphere. It can be called the “correspondence-strategy”. This strategy uses constitu-
tionalist concepts in their ordinary, historical or accepted meaning and looks for 
corresponding phenomena on the international level. It does not change or adapt 
the original meaning of the concepts. The implicit premise of this strategy is that 
the constitution and state functions can be “unbundled”.45 The “reference-
concept”46 suffices to justify the use of constitutional language, for example, if 
there is adequate evidence for “common values manifested through an emerging 
                                                        
44
  See, for example, B. F a s s b e n d e r , The Meaning of International Constitutional Law, in: 
R.St.J. Macdonald/D.M. Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism, 2005, 837, 838. For more 
details, see infra II.2.a. 
45
  An influential study of the concept of the “unbundled”, “disaggregated state” was provided by 
Anne-Marie S l a u g h t e r  (A New World Order, Princeton 2004). 
46
  When we speak of constitutional “functions”, “substance” or “elements”, we use a reference-
concept. In the discourse on constitutions and constitutionalism this is the state constitution or consti-
tutional system of state-government, as ordinary language implies, see The Concise Oxford Diction-
ary of Current English, ed. by R.E. A l l e n , London 1995, 246. 
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hierarchy of norms and structures for the enforcement of these values in the inter-
national sphere”,47 according to one variant of the correspondence-strategy.  
c) The third strategy comprises a number of highly divergent approaches to in-
troduce constitutional language on the international level. In contrast to those 
strategies mentioned above, the third strategy legitimizes the use of constitutional 
vocabulary by extending the legal discourse, opening it, in particular, to ethical and 
pragmatic arguments. It can be called the “ethical-pragmatic” strategy. To be in-
cluded here is, for example, the vision of world constitutionalism according to 
which it is reasonable for states to v i e w  themselves as part of an international 
constitutional order (H a b e r m a s ).48 Equally, the normative claim, founded upon 
practical reason, that there s h o u l d  b e  a world constitution (E m m e r i c h -
F r i t z s c h e ) can be considered to fall under this strategy.49 
In the following, we shall outline the three strategies in further detail and apply 
this division of strategies to approaches of world constitutionalism currently pro-
minent in legal literature. Completeness is not intended. It is worth emphasizing 
that this division is of a “formal” nature; it refers to the method of justifying the 
use of constitutional language and does not depict variants of what could be con-
sidered the “international constitution”. In other words, proponents of world con-
stitutionalism may advocate significantly divergent substantive concepts of a world 
constitution or world constitutionalism, but, nevertheless, use the same strategy to 
legitimize their use of constitutionalist vocabulary.  
2. “Constitution” by Terminological Adaption (Semantic Strategy) 
As outlined above, conceptions of world constitutionalism based on the seman-
tic strategy re-define the notion “constitution” (or related terms) in order to make 
constitutional language applicable in the international sphere. There is an impres-
sive diversity of contemporary variants employing this strategy: 
a) A popular and “classical” variant establishes an inextricable link between the 
notion “constitution” and the term “c o m m u n i t y ”. In a nutshell: there is no (le-
gal) community without a constitution. This approach can be found, for example, 
in the writings of Bardo F a s s b e n d e r .50 F a s s b e n d e r  proceeds from the prem-
                                                        
47
  See E. d e  W e t , The International Constitutional Order, 55 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (2006), 51-76. For more details see infra III.3.c. 
48
  J. H a b e r m a s , Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?, in: ibid., 
Der gespaltene Westen, 2004, 113, 159. 
49
  A. E m m e r i c h - F r i t s c h e , Vom Völkerrecht zum Weltrecht, 2007, 1045. 
50
  Hermann M o s l e r  can be considered a predecessor of F a s s b e n d e r  with respect to the strat-
egy of introducing constitutional language into the international sphere. He argued that the constitu-
tion is the “highest law” of a society transforming it from a society into a community. M o s l e r  con-
ceived of the international society as a legal community to the extent that it is able to live according to 
legal rules. Norms dealing with the creation, validity and termination of law form the constitution of 
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ise that the “fundamental legal order of any autonomous community or body poli-
tic can be addressed as a constitution”.51 This is essentially a semantic move, a pos-
tulate on the basis of which the substantive argument ensues.52  
b) A closely related variant links the notion “constitution” with the concepts of 
“h i e r a r c h y  o f  n o r m s ” and “b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  a  c o m m u n i t y ”. This 
approach underpins Bruno S i m m a ’ s  well-known article “From Bilateralism to 
Community Interests in International Law”, published in 1995.53 Referring to the 
“great majority of writers”, S i m m a  argues that the specific meaning of the con-
cept of “constitution” is to be considered as a combination of the formal element 
of priority over “ordinary” law and the substantive element of basic rules of a 
community.54 It is this definition of constitution which makes the concept adapt-
able to the international plane.55 
c) It has also been suggested that a link be established between the notion “con-
stitution” and the term “s y s t e m  o f  g o v e r n a n c e ”. Christian T o m u s c h a t , 
for example, argues that any (modern) system of governance possesses a constitu-
tion which consists of the rules on law-making, on the judicial function and on the 
discharge of the executive.56 By defining a constitution this way, T o m u s c h a t  
makes constitutional language applicable to the international community, which, 
as he shows, encompasses a system of governance.57 
                                                        
the international legal community. See H. M o s l e r , The International Society as a Legal Community, 
1974, 14, 32, 84-85. 
51
  F a s s b e n d e r  (note 44), 838; see ibid., The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the In-
ternational Community, 36 Col. J Transnat’l L (1998), 529, 532-538, 555-561. 
52
  The substantive argument roughly runs as follows: F a s s b e n d e r  focuses on the issue of what 
the international constitution actually i s . According to his well-known answer, the international con-
stitution is located in the Charter of the U.N.: The Charter must – “in its entirety” – be referred to as 
the constitution of the international community. To support his view, he points – borrowing a term 
from Bruce A c k e r m a n  – to its “constitutional moment”, to the hierarchy of norms established by 
Art. 103, to the Charter’s functions of governance in the international community, and to its central 
role in defining membership in the international community. Thereby, he combines to some extent the 
“semantic strategy” with what we call the “correspondence strategy”. For criticism of F a s s -
b e n d e r ’s argument, see, e.g., A. F i s c h e r - L e s c a n o , Globalverfassung: Verfassung der Weltge-
sellschaft, 88 ARSP (2002), 349-378, 376; see also P a u l u s  (note 14), 318 for further criticism. 
53
  B. S i m m a , From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, RdC 250 (1994-
VI), 225 et seq. 
54
  Ibid., 260. 
55
  As is the case for F a s s b e n d e r , S i m m a  is mainly interested in whether the Charter of the 
UN fulfills the requirements set out in his definition of a constitution. In support of his affirming an-
swer, S i m m a  states that Article 103 guarantees the primacy of the Charter over “ordinary” interna-
tional law, and the Charter codifies guiding principles such as sovereign equality, prohibition of the 
threat or use of force, good faith and the principle of the intangibility of the “domaine réservé” (see 
ibid., 258-261). 
56
  Ch. T o m u s c h a t , Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, RdC 241 
(1993-IV), 198, 216. 
57
  For the detection of the “international constitution”, T o m u s c h a t  suggests focusing on the 
“meta-rules” or – relying on the terminology by H.L.A. H a r t  – the “rules of recognition” of interna-
tional law. These consist of the rules that decide on how other rules are produced, how they enter into 
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d) Another approach defines “constitution” in terms of “l a w - m a k i n g ” and 
“c r e a t i o n  o f  n e t w o r k  s t r u c t u r e s ”: For example, Christian W a l t e r  ar-
gues that developments such as globalization and internationalization “transform” 
the notion of constitution.58 W a l t e r  finds it necessary to “disaggregate” the con-
stitution.59 This re-definition of the constitution-concept allows him to identify a 
“proliferation of constitutions” when law-making takes place in the international 
sphere or when representatives meet in order to create “network structures”.60 
These processes of international constitutionalization do not, however, become in-
tegrated in a constitutional super-structure. There is thus no single “international 
constitution”,61 but rather – due to the decentralization of international law – a 
range of sectoral processes of constitutionalization leading to specific “partial con-
stitutions” in international law.62 W a l t e r  locates constitutional processes in fields 
such as international economic law or law of the sea where there are separate 
mechanisms of dispute settlement in place.63 
e) An economy-related variant of re-defining the term “constitution” is sug-
gested by Peter B e h r e n s . For B e h r e n s , the decision to uphold free trade is a 
constitutional decision par excellence, a decision implying a constitutional frame-
work.64 Given that there is a system of free trade on every level of economic trans-
action already in place, i.e. on the global, supranational and national planes, the re-
definition of the concept of the economic constitution allows B e h r e n s  to con-
clude that there is a world economic constitution.65 
f) A further variant creates a link between the notions “constitutional reality” 
and “spontaneous order”. Andreas F i s c h e r - L e s c a n o  argues that the structural 
particularities of the world society can be viewed as a “global constitutional real-
ity”, which in turn can best be described as a “spontaneous order”.66 He regards 
                                                        
force and how they are implemented. These rules obligate states even when they have not consented to 
them and thereby provide a general framework or the constitution of the international legal order. The 
rule of sovereign equality of states in Art. 2 (1) of the UN Charter or Art. 38 of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, for example, belong to these meta-rules, according to T o m u s c h a t  
(ibid., 211). 
58
  W a l t e r  (note 22), 170, 194. 
59
  Ibid., 174. 
60
  Ibid., 194. 
61
  Ibid., 173. 
62
  Ibid., 201. 
63
  Note that the basic documents of some international organizations are entitled “constitution”, 
e.g. the “Constitution” of the Food and Agricultural Organization, the “Constitution” of the World 
Health Organization, or the “Constitution” of the International Labour Organization. 
64
  P. B e h r e n s , Weltwirtschaftsverfassung, Jb. für Neue Polit. Ökonomie 2000, 5, 18. 
65
  Ibid., 24. 
66
  F i s c h e r - L e s c a n o  (note 52), 352, referring to S. O e t e r , Internationale Organisation oder 
Weltföderation? Die organisierte Staatengemeinschaft und das Verlangen nach einer Verfassung der 
Freiheit, in: H. Brunkhorst/M. Kettner (eds.), Globalisierung und Demokratie: Wirtschaft, Recht, 
Medien, Frankfurt 2000, 208, 211 et seq. The term “spontaneous order” is borrowed from Friedrich 
August v o n  H a y e k . 
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international protection of human rights as a prime embodiment of the interna-
tional spontaneous order, since, here, non-state actors, particularly NGOs, social 
movements etc., take a significant part in international conflict resolution.67 Ac-
cording to F i s c h e r - L e s c a n o , the “global constitutional reality” may, however, 
not be regarded as a constitution “in the full sense of the term”.68 It is a constitu-
tion with a considerably weaker substance. This is mainly due to the fact the global 
constitution only partially and indirectly reflects reality.69  
g) A somewhat surprising variant of the semantic strategy has been presented by 
Ronald St. John M a c d o n a l d . The author suggests associating the term “constitu-
tion” with the idea of a “v i s i o n ” of a society. Referring to Philip A l l o t , M a c -
d o n a l d  argues that the constitution is a “high-level abstraction of policy”, a soci-
ety’s vision of its past, present and future.70 He searches for such a vision in the in-
ternational sphere and finds it in the UN Charter. M a c d o n a l d  interprets its Pre-
amble as a statement of “collective willing by a society and therefore an expression 
of constitutionalism present, past, and future”.71 M a c d o n a l d  regards the hierar-
chy of norms established by Article 103 of the Charter as “one of the most persua-
sive arguments in favor of the view that the Charter is in fact a constitution”.72 
h) The last variant to be mentioned here proposes a link between the use of con-
stitutional language and the relevance of the “goals” of constitutionalism. In this 
respect, Thomas C o t t i e r  and Maya H e r t i g  assert that while the “goals” of con-
stitutionalism, i.e. – according to the authors – liberty, justice, dignity, equity and 
security, remained unimpaired,73 “a modern theory of constitutionalism” has to ac-
count for the changes of the world.74 They regard constitutionalization as an 
“open-ended” process75 which extends “constitutional structures to fora and layers 
of governance other than nations”.76 The main task of constitutionalism, according 
to the authors, is to i n t e r f a c e  the different layers of governance from local to 
global levels, thereby “building a house with different stories”.77 
                                                        
67
  F i s c h e r - L e s c a n o  (note 52), 357-359. 
68
  Ibid., 376. 
69
  Ibid. 
70
  R.St.J. M a c d o n a l d , The International Community as a Legal Community, in: idem/D.M. 
Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism, Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Com-
munity, Leiden 2005, 853, 859. 
71
  Ibid., 860. 
72
  Ibid., 862. 
73
  Th. C o t t i e r /M. H e r t i g , The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism, 7 Max Planck 
UNYB (2003), 261, 262. 
74
  Ibid., 263: “[...] the historical, political and economic context has undergone important changes 
which a modern theory of constitutionalism has to account for if it is to ensure its traditional functions 
and to contribute to global governance.” 
75
  Ibid., 283. 
76
  Ibid., 264. 
77
  Ibid. 
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3. “Constitution” by Analogy (Correspondence Strategy) 
We shall now turn to several variants of what we call the “correspondence strat-
egy”. Approaches referred to under this strategy take the state-centered concept of 
constitution and constitutionalism as a baseline or reference-concept and seek to 
discover equivalent constitutional “elements”, “functions”, or “substance” in the 
international sphere: 
a) It is possible, for example, to search for a particular constitutional element or 
function that one considers as “the” core of constitutionalism. Brun-Otto B r y d e , 
for example, takes the limitation of the omnipotence of the legislator by superior 
legal principles as a fundamental core of constitutionalism.78 One may speak of a 
constitutionalized international order, if it mirrors this fundamental core.79 
b) A value-oriented variant suggests concentrating mainly on the s u b s t a n t i v e  
d i m e n s i o n  of the international legal order. This approach – which emphasizes 
the ethical dimension of international law – can be found, for example, in the writ-
ings of Daniel T h ü r e r . Referring to a thought by Lon L. F u l l e r , he finds that in 
order to determine the rank of norms in the international legal order, it might be 
adequate to focus more on their quality and content than on the formal aspects of 
their creation.80 For T h ü r e r , ius cogens rules, norms with erga omnes effect, and 
rules on international crimes constitute the substantive “core” of the international 
constitution. 
c) A variant which is closely connected to the aforementioned is presented by 
Erika d e  W e t . Departing from the premise that state and international constitu-
tional structures, taken together, constitute what she calls a “constitutional con-
glomeration” (Verfassungskonglomerat), she explores the constitutional shape of 
the international legal order by focusing on a community-element, a hierarchy of 
norms manifesting a common system of values, and rudimentary structures for 
their enforcement in the international sphere.81 
                                                        
78
  B r y d e  (note 19), 61, 62. 
79
  B r y d e  uncovers a process of gradual realization of the core of constitutionalism by pointing to 
four developments of international law: the acceptance of international community interest, interests 
of individuals as final points of legitimization (Menschen als Legtimiationsbezugspunkt), a hierarchy of 
norms, and the application of methods of legal interpretation which are emancipated from the will of 
the contracting parties (ibid., 63-67). 
80
  D. T h ü r e r , Recht der internationalen Gemeinschaft und Wandel der Staatlichkeit, in: idem/J.-
F. Aubert/J.P. Müller (eds.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz – Droit constitutionnel suisse, 2001, § 3, 
no. 29. See also ibid., Internationales “Rule of Law” – innerstaatliche Demokratie, SZIER 4/95, 455-
478. 
81
  E. d e  W e t , The International Constitutional Order, 55 Internat’l & Comp. LQ, 51 et seq. In 
her view, the entirety of states and other international actors, notably international organizations, 
form a community (ibid., 54-57). The rules with ius cogens character and erga omnes effect and the 
practice of international courts manifest in many respects a common system of values (ibid., 57-63). 
Finally, rudimentary enforcement structures exist in the form of international courts and the UN Se-
curity Council (ibid., 64-71). 
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d) A fourth variant highlights the role of the constitution with respect to liberty. 
Giovanni B i a g g i n i , for example, emphasizes that this function can only be ful-
filled if there is an effective interplay of three institutional guarantees: human 
rights, separation of powers, and participation of a people as “pouvoir constitu-
ant”.82 Taken together, they form what Thomas P a i n e  called a “grammar” of lib-
erty.83 B i a g g i n i  searches for aspects of this arrangement in the international 
sphere.84 With respect to the European level, he detects a relatively effective ar-
rangement, even if the democracy-element is weak. On the global level, however, 
there is only a nucleus of the arrangement. B i a g g i n i  suggests a moderate use of 
constitutional language in the international sphere. 
e) A further variant, presented by Anne P e t e r s , focuses on the function of 
“c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o t e c t i o n ”. She argues that “full constitutional protec-
tion” can only be provided by the interplay of different levels of governance.85 
State and international constitutional structures “complement” each other – they 
create complementary orders.86 P e t e r s  distinguishes numerous traditional formal 
and substantive constitutional elements and thereby employs various reference-
concepts to the international sphere.87 She admits that the outcome depends en-
tirely on this choice of a reference-concept. Regarding the formal constitutional 
properties, she finds – using Bruce A c k e r m a n ’ s  terminology – that there have 
been several “constitutional moments”88 on the international level in the past and 
that there is an obvious hierarchy89 of norms,90 but nevertheless concludes that 
there is at most an “embryonic” international constitution. With respect to its sub-
stantive properties, she finds that one can hardly speak of a constitution in the 
value-oriented sense.91  
f) Pierre-Marie D u p u y  examines the “c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d i m e n s i o n s ” of 
the international sphere. D u p u y  locates the substance of a constitution first in its 
                                                        
82
  G. B i a g g i n i , Die Idee der Verfassung – Neuausrichtung im Zeitalter der Globalisierung?, 
Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht (ZSR), 2000 I, 445, 458. 
83
  Ibid., 458. 
84
  Ibid., 459-460. 
85
  P e t e r s  (note 15), 535, 537. 
86
  P e t e r s  argues that the “constitutionalist reconstruction” of international law is a “desirable re-
action” to de-constitutionalization on the domestic level (ibid., 536). The question whether state and 
supranational (European) constitutional structures complement each other is addressed in detail in: 
eadem, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas, 2001. 
87
  P e t e r s  (note 15), 538-540. 
88
  Ibid., 539. 
89
  Ibid., 538-539. 
90
  With respect to the UN Charter, P e t e r s  notes: “[...] the UN Charter does not codify enough 
of what is important and basic in international law. There is a lot of ‘constitutional substance’ outside 
the UN-Charter” (ibid., 538). 
91
  Ibid., 540. P e t e r s  further developed her position in: eadem, Compensatory Constitutionalism: 
The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 19 (2006), 579-610. 
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material (substantive) dimension, meaning “a set of legal principles of paramount 
importance for every one of the subjects belonging to the social community ruled 
by it”.92 The institutional (organic) dimension of a constitution, then, comprises 
rules pertaining to the institutional design.93 In principle, according to D u p u y , 
these dimensions cannot be separated from one another as the second is necessary 
for the promotion of the first.94 D u p u y  thus starts by asking what the substance 
of a constitution i n  g e n e r a l  consists of; he employs a correspondence-strategy 
in that he devises a reference-concept for which a certain universal application can 
be claimed and applies this constitution-concept to the international plane.95 
4. “Constitution” by Normative Reconstruction? (Ethical-pragmatic  
 Strategy) 
A third track to legitimize the use of constitutional language for phenomena on 
the international plane is to give ethical reasons why the global order s h o u l d  
h a v e  a constitution or to provide pragmatic reasons why its subjects s h o u l d  
v i e w  t h e m s e l v e s  a s  h a v i n g  a constitution. Though heterogeneous, these 
approaches re-design international relations from an ethical or pragmatic angle.  
a) In line with what we call an “ethical-pragmatic strategy”, Jürgen H a b e r m a s  
presents empirical as well as normative reasons why states and their citizens should 
view themselves as integral parts of a political constitution of a decentralized world 
society (politisch verfasste Weltgesellschaft). According to H a b e r m a s , “the UN 
Charter provides a framework, wherein the Member States need no longer think of 
themselves as subjects of international law treaties only; jointly with their citizens 
they may conceive of themselves as constituent members of a political constitution 
of a world society”.96 In this political world constitution the states are not simply 
units of a global superstructure, but part of a decentralized world society in which 
supranational and transnational structures fulfill the demands of global cosmopol-
itanism.97 While H a b e r m a s  gives certain credit to positivist accounts for concep-
tualizing the UN Charter as a global constitution, the thrust of his argument is to 
reject competing visions of international relations. These alternative visions of the 
global order – his main adversary being the U.S.-model of unilaterally introducing 
                                                        
92
  D u p u y  (note 16), 3. 
93
  Ibid. 
94
  Ibid. 
95
  D u p u y  examines whether the UN Charter could be regarded as the international constitution. 
With respect to the substantive dimension, he notes that the Charter sets forth – despite its incom-
pleteness – principles paramount to the international community (ibid., 15). More problematic in his 
view is the character of the Charter as an institutional constitution; there is neither a judicial review of 
the resolutions of the Security Council nor any political control (ibid., 27). 
96
   H a b e r m a s  (note 48), 159 (translation by the authors). 
97
  Ibid., 134. 
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and enforcing ethical values in international relations (“hegemonic liberalism”) – 
fail, in H a b e r m a s ’  view, to live up to the necessities of the new “post-national 
constellation”. The new international reality requires, in H a b e r m a s ’  opinion, a 
global system of multilevel-governance which “on a supranational level [...] safe-
guards world peace and respect for human rights as well as on a transnational level 
tackles problems of global domestic politics”,98 such as international economic and 
environmental problems.99 In H a b e r m a s ’  account, thus, constitutional termi-
nology is applied to international relations as part of an ethiced-pragmatic vision of 
the international order which, it is claimed, states have good reasons to adopt.  
b) In a second variant of the “ethical-pragmatic strategy”, the “world constitu-
tion” ultimately derives from a rule of practical reason. Angelika E m m e r i c h -
F r i t s c h e  outlines a multi-layered concept of a “world constitution”, encompass-
ing all constitutions from the regional (Kommunalverfassung) up to the global 
level (Welt- und Weltbürgerliche Verfassung).100 According to E m m e r i c h -
F r i t s c h e , current public international law, particularly in the concept of ius co-
gens, already embodies a partial, prototype version of the world constitution. 
However, the existing world constitution is viewed as deficient in the light of the 
“right of humankind” (Menschheitsrecht).101 The creation of a “world constitution” 
which overcomes these deficiencies, especially visible in the fields of human rights 
protection, the fight against international terrorism and the regulation of migra-
tion, is finally conceived of as a “rule of practical reason” (Gebot der praktischen 
Vernunft).102 Thus, the approach by E m m e r i c h - F r i t s c h e  essentially provides 
ethical reasons for the adoption of a constitutionalist framework of international 
relations.  
5. Lessons and Pitfalls of the Current Debate On World  
 Constitutionalism  
In this Part, we have outlined three strategies to justify the use of constitutional 
language used by first-order accounts on world constitutionalism. These first-
order accounts either affirm or reject the existence, ethical necessity or pragmatic 
desirability of world constitutionalism or a world constitution. It is important, in 
                                                        
 
98
 Ibid., 143 (translation by the authors). 
 
99
  Ibid., 134. 
100
  E m m e r i c h - F r i t s c h e  (note 49), 312-315, 1045. In contrast to H a b e r m a s ’ vision of a de-
centralized world society, E m m e r i c h - F r i t s c h e  advocates a “subsidiary, minimal world-
republic”, based on the notion of a “world civitas”, which is endowed with limited enforcement com-
petences (ibid., 629-654, 1055). 
101
  The “right of humankind” (Menschheitsrecht) grants a formal “right to have rights” and essen-
tially consists of the dignity principle and a “cosmopolitan right” (Weltbürgerrecht), ibid., 459-572, 
1039-1040. 
102
  Ibid., 306-307, 1045. 
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our view, to distinguish clearly between the substance of these accounts (e.g. the 
question of which rules belong to the “global constitution”) and the strategy they 
use to introduce constitutional language. 
Positivist first-order approaches to the problem of world constitutionalism try 
to answer the question whether there exists something like a world constitution or 
a process of world constitutionalism. As demonstrated above, they legitimize the 
use of constitutional vocabulary either by re-defining key terms in order to make 
them applicable to the international legal order (semantic strategy), or they use ref-
erence-concepts derived from the state-constitutional order or from an allegedly 
universal constitution-concept and look for corresponding international phenom-
ena (correspondence strategy). These approaches have, however, a tendency to 
immunize themselves against the question whether the use of constitutional lan-
guage is adequate or not. This problem has two aspects. First, in the absence of a 
universally accepted or applicable concept of “constitution”, the question of em-
pirical adequacy arises. Statements on the existence of a world constitution – as has 
been shown – either start with a definition which is of a postulate nature and tends 
to shadow disintegrating facts (semantic strategy) or the existence of a world con-
stitution is regarded as dependent on the (sometimes undertheorized) choice of a 
particular reference-concept (correspondence-strategy). Second, there is what we 
are tempted to call the “Trojan Horse” effect of constitutionalist vocabulary. Con-
stitutionalist language “dignifies” phenomena and processes which tend to develop 
a previously hidden dynamic (e.g. in the fields of human rights interpretation or 
humanitarian intervention). Positivist approaches which confine themselves to 
identifying these constitutional phenomena and processes in the international legal 
order tend to be silent on this larger agenda of world constitutionalism: can the 
global institutional order really live up to the demands of constitutional language? 
And, more important still, is world constitutionalism really a desirable option in 
the development of world affairs? 
Questions of the latter kind are rather addressed by first-order approaches using 
an ethical-pragmatic strategy. Taking into account legal arguments put forth by 
positivist accounts, they extend the debate and focus on normative or pragmatic 
reasons for a world constitution or world constitutionalism. In this respect, they 
offer the normative framework or superstructure within which positivist ap-
proaches can be interpreted and developed further; thus, positivist and normative 
reconstructions are complementary. Taken together, they may provide gainful in-
sights into the problem of world constitutionalism.103  
However, any of these first-order accounts of world constitutionalism (referring 
to the affirmation or rejection of a world constitution or a global process of consti-
                                                        
103
  Armin v o n  B o g d a n d y  provides an example of how T o m u s c h a t ’ s  version of world 
constitutionalism can be analyzed within the theoretical framework of H a b e r m a s ’ political consti-
tution of a decentralized world society, see idem, Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment 
on a Proposal from Germany, 47 Harv. Int’l LJ (2006), 223-242. 
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tutionalism), suffers from two “blind spots” in our view. There is the described 
problem of empirical adequacy which cannot entirely be solved by (implicitly) re-
garding the disintegrating trends outlined above just as “outliers” or “empirical 
shortcomings”. Serious irritations remain. First-order accounts often also avoid 
questions related to the nature of the world-constitutionalism-concept itself. What 
exactly is it really about? What purpose is served by endorsing the concept? Why 
is it so successful among legal scholars? 
The use of a constitutionalist vocabulary with respect to the international sphere 
– if we are right – is connected with the ambition to contribute to a reshaping of 
the international world by changing how it is perceived. Its aim is to change the 
society’s knowledge of the international sphere by propagating a vocabulary with 
specific implications and an implied “agenda”. “World constitutionalism” seems to 
be a bundle of ideas which aim to provide a certain coherence and logic to knowl-
edge of the international sphere. In Part III, we shall explain in more detail what 
we mean by this.  
III. World Constitutionalism Revisited: A View from Social 
 Constructivism 
In the following, we shall not provide another first-order account on the exis-
tence – or the ethical or pragmatic necessity – of a world constitution or global 
constitutionalism. We shall consider the problem of world constitutionalism from 
a somewhat different angle. This alternative path to the problem relies largely on 
the theoretical framework provided by social constructivism, a theory currently at 
the forefront of international relations scholarship.104 It merits comment that this 
meta-level approach to world constitutionalism is primarily explanatory; it neither 
adduces further first-level descriptive evidence nor provides other normative rea-
sons for world constitutionalism. Instead it encourages a particular perspective 
which may help relieve the debate of its “blind spots” and thereby perhaps allow 
for a more enlightened discussion of the constitutionalist alternative. By enabling 
informed criticism of the present debate on world constitutionalism, the proposed 
“third path” reveals its critical potential.  
                                                        
104
  For an overview of constructivism in international relations, see E. A d l e r , Constructivism and 
International Relations, in W. Carlsnaes/Th. Risse/B.A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International 
Relations, London etc. 2006, 95-118; detailed comments on the philosophical and sociological origins 
of social constructivism can be found in J.G. R u g g i e , What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-
Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 International Organization (1998), 855, 857 
et seq. 
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1. The Social Constructivist Perspective 
Despite its success in international relations theory, constructivism presently 
does not gain much attention from international lawyers.105 What is it all about? 
a) It has become common in political and sociological scholarship to view the 
international order and international politics as a socially constructed reality.106 So-
cial constructivism, as understood here, – though not undisputed, but in line with 
some of the most eminent scholarship in this field – refers to a meta-theory about 
the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality.107 In es-
sence, it claims that intersubjective knowledge and ideas have “constitutive effects 
on social reality and its evolution”.108 Constructivism departs from the insight that 
human agents and social structures are interrelated or mutually constitutive:109 
Human agency is influenced and shaped by a social environment which it has cre-
ated itself. In empirical studies, constructivists have documented the effect of inter-
subjective knowledge and ideas, e.g. the impact of a global norm of racial equality 
on the termination of apartheid in South Africa.110 
How can this mutual constitutiveness of agency and structure be further ex-
plained? In this respect, the process of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  is of importance. 
How do institutions come into existence? In a simplified way, one could say that 
they are based on habitualized practice of which every member of the social com-
munity knows.111 It is this practice which establishes the meaning of the particular 
institution. For example, the institution of “fire-fighters” is commonly associated 
with extinguishing fires. This habitualized practice establishes the meaning of 
“fire-fighters”. Our socially induced understanding of this institution is, however, 
challenged by the reprogrammed world in Ray B r a d b u r y ’ s  “Fahrenheit 451”, 
where it is the duty of fire-fighters to set fires, rather than extinguish them. Once 
this understanding is habitualized, in a constructivist perspective, it could become 
part of the collective understanding of the institution of “fire-fighters”. Certainly, 
                                                        
105
  In general, legal scholars are hesitant to draw on international relations theory. For a prominent 
exception, see A.-M. S l a u g h t e r , International Law and International Relations, RdC 285 (2000), 9-
250. On the success of constructivism in international relations theory, see St. G u z z i n i , A Recon-
struction of Constructivism in International Relations, 6 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. (2000), 147 et seq. 
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  A. W e n d t , Social Theory of International Politics, 1999, 1; G u z z i n i  (note 105), 159-160; 
P.L. B e r g e r /Th. L u c k m a n n , The Social Construction of Reality, 1966, 69: “(...) social order is a 
human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human production.” 
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  A d l e r  (note 104), 95. 
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  Ibid., 102; G u z z i n i  (note 105), 160: “In a nutshell, constructivism, as understood here, is 
epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge, and ontologically about the construction 
of social reality.” [emphasis in the orig.]. 
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  E. A d l e r , Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, 3 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 
(1997), 319, 324-325. 
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  For an overview of the empirical impact of constructivism, see R u g g i e  (note 104), 867 (with 
further references). 
111
  See B e r g e r / L u c k m a n n  (note 106), 65-109. 
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there are innumerable institutions in social reality. In principle, any socially rele-
vant practice can be institutionalized. All institutions consist of the two mentioned 
elements: habitualized practice and common knowledge. This concept of “institu-
tion” thereby emphasizes the r e l e v a n c e  of the s o c i e t y ’ s  k n o w l e d g e  of 
habitualized practice f o r  t h e  s o c i e t a l  r e a l i t y . Habitualized practice takes 
the form of rules, norms and concepts of world-understanding. When institution-
alized, the latter become part of an “intersubjective knowledge” or “collective un-
derstanding”112.113 In this sense, then, human agency continuously creates or alters 
social structures by the institutionalization of intersubjective knowledge. At the 
same time, constructivists maintain that these institutions deeply affect our behav-
ior and identity.114 To this we shall turn now.  
b) How can social constructivism further our understanding of international 
law? To be more specific: how does social constructivism improve our comprehen-
sion of what world constitutionalism is? There are a number of ways in which the 
international legal discourse could benefit from insights of constructivism. In this 
essay, we limit ourselves to a discussion of world constitutionalism as an “institu-
tion” in the constructivist meaning and the consequences that follow from this 
categorization.  
The term “institutionalized practice” or “institution” is crucial for the construc-
tivist approach to world constitutionalism. Lawyers usually adopt a narrow con-
cept of “institution”, understood as referring either to an organization – for exam-
ple, to the institutions of world trade law such as the WTO – or to a single right or 
a bundle of rights. The “right to self-defense” would be an example for an institu-
tion in the last sense. Constructivists offer a far wider meaning of the notion: they 
understand “institutions as reified [or ‘objectified’, the authors] sets of intersubjec-
tive constitutive and regulative rules that, in addition to helping coordinate and 
pattern behavior and channel it in one direction rather than another, also help es-
tablish new collective identities and shared interests and practices”.115  
In the following, we shall use the term “institution” as referring to a bundle of 
social rules and norms116 which have the described two effects: the regulative effect 
of directing human agency in a particular way (r e g u l a t i v e  r u l e s ) and the iden-
tity- or common goal-shaping effect (c o n s t i t u t i v e  r u l e s ). This means, rules 
and norms are not only intended to have a causal effect, i.e. prescribing a certain 
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  On this terminology, borrowed from J. H a b e r m a s , see Th. R i s s e , “Let’s Argue!”, Com-
municative Action in International Relations, 54 International Organization (2000), 1, 10 et seq. 
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  See A d l e r  (note 104), 102. 
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  Ibid., 104. 
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  A d l e r  (note 104), 104. 
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k i n k , International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 International Organization (1998), 
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behavior, but they also help to understand who we “are” as members of a particu-
lar social community.117 A change in social norms and rules, then, may lead to a 
changed perception of social identity. While lawyers are used to considering the 
regulative effect of individual legal rules and institutions, they usually do not have 
the conceptual or methodological tools to adequately capture the constitutive ef-
fect of legal rules. In this regard, we see the real innovative potential of a social 
constructivist account of legal institutions.  
c) What follows, then, from this constructivist understanding of “institutions” 
for the international sphere? Human agency on the international plane is, of 
course, channeled through international legal institutions, such as “human rights”, 
“non-intervention”, “United Nations”, “self-defense”, “diplomatic immunity” etc. 
In the light of the constructivist approach, one may ask about their constitutive, 
identity-shaping effect. In this regard, the s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n  of such actors on 
the international plane as states, international organizations, activists etc. is highly 
relevant. It makes a difference with respect to the identity or self-perception of 
states if they regard inter-state relations to be “programmed” by the Westphalian 
paradigm of sovereignty or if they endorse the view that international relations are 
embedded in a constitutional design. The constructivist understanding of “institu-
tion” is also sensitive to potential social change. It sees change “less as the altera-
tion in the positions of material things than as the emergence of new constitutive 
rules, the evolution and transformation of new social structures, and the agent-
related origins of social processes”.118  
2. Practical Consequences I: World Constitutionalism as an Attempt 
 to Create New Intersubjective Knowledge 
In the view of the authors, it is worthwhile reconsidering world constitutional-
ism as a specific “institution” originating from and further developed by inten-
tional human agency, i.e. by a specific “epistemic community”. As an international 
institution in the described sense, it comprises legal, social, and perhaps also cul-
tural rules characterized by the two effects outlined above. Though there is no 
unanimity as to which rules necessarily belong here, world constitutionalism pro-
poses a set of intersubjective rules with a regulative effect. For example: it sets cer-
tain limits to the i d e a  of state sovereignty – to the concept which underpins the 
legal rules in this field. More important, however, seems to be the “constitutive ef-
fect” in the described sense. While originally created and continually developed by 
scholarly debate, world constitutionalism as an institution will increasingly shape 
the world view of human agents, global activists and – to some extent – of politi-
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  Th. R i s s e , Social Constructivism Meets Globalization, in: D. Held/A. McGrew (eds.), Glob-
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cians. Since – from a constructivist perspective – “language expressions represent a 
potential for new constitutions of reality”,119 one may look at accepted interna-
tional legal language for evidence. The constitutive effect of world constitutional-
ism becomes terminologically visible in accepted legal institutions such as the 
“common heritage of mankind”, the “international community”, or the “interna-
tional crimes”. These institutions lie within the “penumbra” of world constitution-
alism and may thus be regarded as norms associated with it. They are particularly 
indicative of a changing world view when they gradually replace or juxtapose 
other, sovereignty-based institutions. The institution of “state immunity”, for ex-
ample, is challenged by that of “international crimes”, or the institution of a “tex-
tual approach” to international legal instruments is partly replaced by that of “dy-
namic interpretation”.  
World constitutionalism, as an institution, aims to provide orientation and co-
herence among other, less abstract institutions in the international sphere. It sug-
gests a specific “reading” of institutions such as “human rights adjudication”, “ius 
cogens”, “humanitarian intervention”, and “recognition” of states. It thereby tries 
to establish a new international identity, a new collective understanding of the in-
ternational social community. The success of world constitutionalism is, in our 
view, largely due to this constitutive effect which it undoubtedly has among legal 
scholars and other relevant agents in the global debate. What we have previously 
called, somewhat cautiously, the “hidden agenda” or “Trojan Horse effect” of 
world constitutionalism can now be seen as a constructive momentum originating 
primarily from a scholarly debate which tries to establish and shape new intersub-
jective knowledge. In summary, viewing world constitutionalism as an interna-
tional institution in the constructivist sense allows us to interpret the current de-
bate as an attempt to influence the social construction of reality by the relevant ac-
tors.  
3. Practical Consequences II: World Constitutionalism as a 
 “Legitimization Institution” 
Comparing the institution of world constitutionalism with other institutions as, 
e.g., the “right to self-defense”, or even “human rights” – which is by some con-
structivists considered to be an adequate alternative constitutive norm for the in-
ternational order120 – one immediately recognizes some differences. First, there is a 
high level of abstraction in the institution of world constitutionalism. On a formal 
level, it does not directly “command” or “prohibit” a certain behavior, but, never-
theless, indirectly exerts considerable influence on a diverse scale of human agency, 
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  See Th. R i s s e /St. R o p p /K. S i k k i n k  (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International 
Norms and Domestic Change, 1999. 
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ranging from adjudication to lobbying by international NGOs. Second, on the 
substantive side, the rules comprised by the institution of world constitutionalism 
are not fixed; there is high uncertainty about which particular human agency is im-
plied. At the present stage of the international legal order and in the absence of a 
universally shared concept of constitution, little of the substantive content of this 
institution seems given. Rephrasing W. G a l l i e ’ s  insight, one may talk of an “es-
sentially contested i n s t i t u t i o n ”:121 Do we have to advocate a “world republic” 
or a “decentralized world society”? Do we have a duty to engage in “humanitarian 
intervention” in cases of gross violations of human rights? Do we have a duty to 
redistribute resources on a global level, i.e. embrace the idea of global distributive 
justice? Third, contrary to its weak regulative force, world constitutionalism has a 
powerful constitutive effect. It seems to have a remarkable emotional subtext at-
tached to it. Some regard world constitutionalism as a demarcation line between 
Europe and the U.S. – a “clash of world views”.122 
These obvious differences between the institution of world constitutionalism 
and other, more clearly shaped institutions recommend a further differentiation: 
There are “simple international institutions” with relatively clear-cut regulative 
and constitutive effects, as, e.g., the institutions of the state or non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, and there are complex international institutions, such as world 
constitutionalism, globalization or international terrorism. Complex international 
institutions may serve various purposes: fostering economic liberalization and 
market integration (in the case of globalization),123 securing compliance with inter-
national measures (in the case of international terrorism) or introducing a new col-
lective understanding or world view (in the case of world constitutionalism). While 
a systematic constructivist account on the diverse purposes of complex institutions 
of the international legal order is yet to be developed, given the purpose of world 
constitutionalism, one may speak of what we would call a “legitimization institu-
tion”.  
4. Practical Consequences III: Sensitivity to Social Change 
Reviewing the strategies to introduce constitutional language to the interna-
tional legal order, we criticized the first-order accounts of world constitutionalism 
for not adequately addressing the disintegrating trends on the international plane. 
From a constructivist view, world constitutionalism is one international institution 
among many competing ideas, all awaiting institutionalization. The constructivist 
believes that there will never be a perfect harmony or correspondence between the 
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http://www.zaoerv.de/
© 2008, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
648 D i g g e l m a n n / A l t w i c k e r  
ZaöRV 68 (2008) 
object, in this case constitutionalist agency as expressed in international adjudica-
tion, law-making or agenda-setting, and our classification of it.124 But, on this ac-
count, we can become aware of the way that intersubjective knowledge about the 
world “out there” is constructed. The positivist endeavor to “find” evidence for 
world constitutionalism is insufficient or under-informed if it is not accompanied 
by the recognition that the debate first constructs this intersubjective knowledge.125 
A social constructivist account of world constitutionalism thus offers an interpre-
tive lens on world affairs which is more sensitive to changes of the international re-
ality; in the process of world constitutionalism little seems fixed and unchangeable.  
5. Practical Consequences IV: Several Possibilities for 
 Institutionalization 
Our last point draws on the critical potential contained in a social constructivist 
approach. Reviewing the ongoing debate on the collective understanding of the in-
ternational legal order, world constitutionalism does not represent the only possi-
bility for institutionalization in the constructivist sense. There are at least two oth-
ers: “world constitution” and the “world/global constitutionalist movement”. 
They are, of course, interrelated, but their ambitions are somewhat different. The 
concept of a “world constitution” or of an “international constitution”, in our 
view, is hardly appropriate for institutionalization. As described above, the termi-
nologically created expectations regarding its regulative effects would be too far-
reaching and therefore largely illusionary in the foreseeable future. Its agenda is 
overly ambitious and likely to deprive the concept of the intended constitutive ef-
fects. With respect to the “world/global constitutionalist movement”, the situation 
may be different. Its regulative implications are more modest and in line with the 
ambiguous factual basis in the international sphere. However, one may have 
doubts as to whether the “world/global constitutionalist movement” may ever 
have a constitutive, identity-shaping effect similar to the one of, for example, the 
women’s or environmentalists’ international movement. 
Conlusions 
The concept of world constitutionalism currently receives remarkable attention 
among international legal scholars. But is this enthusiasm justified? Is the concept 
of world constitutionalism an adequate analytical tool for the international legal 
order? Can it provide a “realistic utopia” for our time? 
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The authors proceed by examining the ongoing scholarly debate and introduce a 
meta-level critique of the problem of world constitutionalism based on insights 
drawn from a social constructivist model of international relations. 
Part I of the paper surveys the factual basis of the world-constitutionalism-
argument. Three trends in international law are commonly referred to as indica-
tions of constitutional processes: first, the “moralization” of international law, as 
evidenced, e.g., by a growing recognition of humanitarian intervention as an ulti-
mate enforcement measure for human rights; second, the horizontal and vertical 
“differentiation” of the international legal order; third, the emergence of “partial” 
or “parallel constitutions” which complement and permeate domestic constitu-
tions. All of these developments, however, can be contrasted with disintegrating 
trends, which are squarely at odds with the world constitutionalism-argument. The 
first disintegrating trend, a far-reaching disagreement on the commitment to and 
the implications of shared global values, such as the ban on the use of force and 
human rights, mocks the attempt to identify a thorough moralization of the inter-
national legal order. Second, the “differentiation”-based argument for world 
constitutionalism conflicts with the often-analyzed trend of fragmentation in in-
ternational law. Finally, the threat of resorting to unilateral action poses an inher-
ent limit on any argument viewing domestic power as bound by elements of a 
world constitution. Given these ambiguous trends, the success of the world-
constitutionalism-argument cannot simply be derived from its value as an analyti-
cal tool used primarily to describe the current state of international law and/or its 
predominant trends. 
Part II discusses three strategies by which proponents of world constitutiona-
lism seek to legitimize their use of constitutionalist vocabulary:  
The first, the “semantic strategy”, is based on the premise that constitutional 
language needs to be re-defined to be applicable to the particularities of the inter-
national legal order. In a well-known variant employing this strategy, a link is 
established between the concepts of “constitution” and “community.” It is claimed 
that there can be no community without a constitution. Once one can identify an 
“international community”, one may legitimately use constitutionalist vocabulary 
for it. In other variants, the re-defining concepts include, e.g., the notion of mo-
dern “systems of governance”, “law-making and network structures”, statements 
of a collective “vision” or “willing” for a world society’s future etc.  
A second “correspondence-strategy” employs an ordinary language concept of 
constitution as a reference-concept or seeks to defend a universally acceptable ver-
sion of it; proponents using this strategy look for corresponding phenomena in the 
international legal order. In one of its variants, the core of the state-centered con-
cept of a constitution is identified as a limitation of the omnipotence of the legisla-
tor by superior legal principles. Accordingly, the use of constitutionalist vocabula-
ry is justified, if this core element of a constitution is evidenced in international 
law. In some approaches, a substantive quality of the norms is viewed to be the de-
cisive element of a constitution; others regard a functional division of labor of dif-
ferent constitutional levels to lie at the core of any constitutionalist argument.  
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A third “ethical-pragmatic strategy” combines positivist as well as normative 
and pragmatic reasons for endorsing world constitutionalism. In a first variant, 
world constitutionalism is regarded as the appropriate interpretive tool for interna-
tional relations, because it is in a position to meet the challenges posed by “global 
cosmopolitanism”. A second variant claims that a world constitution is ultimately 
a demand of practical reason.  
Part II concludes with a critical analysis of these strategies. The two positivist 
first-order strategies tend to immunize themselves against challenges of empirical 
adequacy; they either suffer from an inherent inclination to turn a blind eye on dis-
integrating trends in the international legal order or they employ reference-
concepts the choice of which is subjective and contestable. Furthermore, the posi-
tivist strategies carry a hidden agenda which they sometimes fail to make explicit. 
To some extent the “ethical-pragmatic strategies” may complement the positivist 
accounts and provide for meaningful agenda-setting in international relations. All 
of these first-order approaches or combinations of them, however, in our view lack 
the explanatory tools to account for the nature and the purpose of world constitu-
tionalism in international legal scholarship and international relations.  
Therefore, in part III, a meta-level critique of world constitutionalism is out-
lined based on the theoretical framework of social constructivism. In the view of 
the authors, the purpose of world constitutionalism is to reshape international rela-
tions by changing our perception of them, rather than to provide an accurate ex-
planation of international legal affairs or developments. In terms of social 
constructivism, the concept of world constitutionalism can be viewed as a specific 
“institution” which originates from intentional human agency. Its value lies not so 
much in having a regulative effect, i.e. directing human agency in a particular way, 
as, e.g. requiring ordinary rules of international law such as the ban on slavery; 
rather and more importantly, it carries a constitutive effect, which helps shape a 
shared identity or develop common goals. As an institution with the described 
constitutive effect, world constitutionalism impacts other accepted legal concepts 
such as the “common heritage of mankind” or “international crimes”. Given the 
abstract nature of world constitutionalism, its strong constitutive and weak regula-
tive effect, the authors suggest speaking of it as a “legitimization institution”. 
If correctly understood as a “legitimization institution”, world constitutionalism 
can indeed be regarded as a promising candidate in the search for a “realistic uto-
pia” for our time. 
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